WILL NEW APPOINTEES TO THE SUPREME COURT BE ABLE TO EFFECT AN OVERRULING OF ROE V. WADE? by Maloy, Richard H. W.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 28 28 (2005-2006)
Issue 1 Article 3
12-16-2009
WILL NEW APPOINTEES TO THE SUPREME
COURT BE ABLE TO EFFECT AN
OVERRULING OF ROE V. WADE?
Richard H. W. Maloy
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard H. W. Maloy, WILL NEW APPOINTEES TO THE SUPREME COURT BE ABLE TO EFFECT AN OVERRULING OF ROE
V. WADE?, 28 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 29 (2005), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss1/3
WILL NEW APPOINTEES TO THE SUPREME 

COURT BE ABLE TO EFFECT AN 

OVERRULING OF ROE v. WADE? 

RICHARD H.W. MALOY* 
INTRODUCTION 
A recent feature story in Time magazine stated, "Overturning 
Roe v. Wade is the Evangelicals' highest ambition ...."1 This was 
supplemental to a previous blurb, under a photo of the U.S. Su­
preme Court Justices, that proclaimed, "Bush may name replace­
ments for as many as three of the Justices ...."2 Recent and 
impending changes in the composition of the Supreme Court beg 
the question whether President Bush could appoint a sufficient 
number of Supreme Court Justices to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1975).3 This Article argues that, regardless of any agenda 
on the part of new appointees to the Supreme Court, it is very un­
likely that Roe will be overruled in the near future. If an appointee 
were intent on the overruling of Roe, that person would have to 
establish, and convince at least four of his or her fellow justices, that 
the holding of Roe is at odds with the supreme law of this land-the 
United States Constitution. This would not be an easy task: Roe is 
* Richard H. W. Maloy is a visiting professor of law at St. Thomas University 
School of Law in Miami, Florida. The author would like to thank Sarah L. Santos, 
Articles Editor of the Western New England Law Review, for her invaluable assistance 
in the preparation of this article. 
1. Karen Tumulty & Matthew Cooper, What Does Bush Owe The Religious 
Right?, TIME, February 7, 2005, at 28. 
2. Id. at 30; see Kenneth L. Manning, Bruce A. Carroll & Robert A. Carp, 
George W. Bush's Potential Supreme Court Nominees: What Impact Might They Have?, 
85 JUDICATURE 278, in seriatim (2002); William P. Marshall, The Judicial Nomination 
Wars, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 819,825 (2005); Alissa Schecter, Choosing Balance: Con­
gressional Powers And The Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1987, 1988 n.12 (2005); Carl Hulse, Abortion Remark by G.O.P Senator Puts Heat on 
Peers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at AI; Robin Toner, Changing Senate Looks Much 
Better to Abortion Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,2004, at A39. 
3. On July 1, 2005, Justice O'Connor announced her retirement effective upon 
the confirmation of her successor. Chief Justice Rehnquist died on September 3, 2005. 
On September 29, 2005 he was replaced by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. 
29 
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founded in the constitutional principles of the separation of church 
and state and rights of privacy, among others. 
Part I of this Article describes Roe in detail; Part II discusses 
the principal Supreme Court progeny of Roe and distills from them 
four reasons why an overruling of Roe is unlikely. First, the over­
ruling of Roe would advance the essentially sectarian position that 
life begins at conception - a judicial construct that would violate 
the constitutional principle of separation of church and state. Sec­
ond, what constitutes a "substantial obstacle" and "nonviable fetus" 
will be grist for the litigation mill to come, but determining these 
questions does not require an overruling of Roe. Third, a majority 
of the Court currently supports an "emerging awareness" theory of 
the right to privacy, and will therefore continue to deem abortion a 
privacy right. Finally, if Lawrence v. Texas is any indication, an 
overruling of Roe would require some agreement among the jus­
tices that factors beyond philosophy demonstrate the unworkability 
of Roe's holding. Part III concludes that an overruling of Roe is, 
therefore, unlikely. 
I. ROE V. WADE (1973)4 
The seminal case of Roe v. Wade began when a pregnant, sin­
gle woman using the pseudonym "Jane Roe" sued Henry Wade, the 
District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas.s She alleged the uncon­
stitutionality of certain articles of the Texas Penal Code, which 
make it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion, as therein de­
fined, except for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. 
The action was consolidated with another case6 for trial before 
a three-judge District Court. Declaratory judgment was granted by 
the District CourF pursuant to the following conclusions of law: 
(3) The fundamental right of single women and married persons 
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
5. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp 1217, 1219 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd in part, rev'd in 
part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
6. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970). A married couple, using the 
pseudonym "John and Mary Doe," filed a companion complaint to that of Jane Roe, 
alleging that if the wife became pregnant, they wished to terminate her pregnancy for 
both medical and financial reasons. The District Court dismissed the Does' complaint 
for lack of standing. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1225. On appeal, the Supreme Court af­
firmed, finding that the Does' position, that if contraceptive devices failed and if Mrs. 
Doe became pregnant she would be prevented from having an abortion, presented only 
a "speculative" claim of an "indirect injury," not within the realm of a "controversy" as 
required by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). Roe, 410 U.S. at 128. 
7. Roe, 314 F. Supp at 1225. 
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to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth 
Amendment,S through the Fourteenth Amendment.9 
(4) The Texas Abortion Laws infringe upon this right. 
(5) The defendant has not demonstrated that the infringement of 
plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights by the Texas Abortion Laws 
is necessary to support a compelling state interest. 
(6) The Texas Abortion Laws are consequently void on their face 
because they are unconstitutionally overbroad. 
(7) The Texas Abortion Laws are void on their face because they 
are vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment. lo 
(8) Abstention, concerning plaintiffs' request for an injunction 
against the enforcement of the Texas Abortion Laws, is 
warranted. 
The court held the Texas Abortion Laws unconstitutionally 
vague but, reluctant to involve itself in state criminal law, did not 
grant an injunction against their enforcement.ll The plaintiffs ap­
pealed the denial of injunctive relief to the Supreme Court, and 
took protective appeals to the Fifth Circuit, which held the appeals 
in abeyance pending decision in the Supreme Court.l2 Thus we 
have Roe v. Wade, in which the Supreme Court issued a seven to 
two decision13 affirming in part and reversing in part14 the ruling of 
the three-judge District Court in Dallas County, Texas.15 
8. The Ninth Amendment provides, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo­
ple." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Supreme Court was not in agreement with the con­
clusion of the District Court that this was the governing provision. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 
154. The District Court probably was influenced by the Supreme Court's reference to 
the Ninth Amendment in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), a case that 
did not concern abortion, but which held unconstitutional a state statute forbidding the 
use of contraceptives by married people. 
9. The Supreme Court never explicitly said that the woman's right to an abortion 
was "fundamental." Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003), thought that Roe stood for that position, but that 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), by implication did away 
with that holding. 
10. The Supreme Court did not reach the vagueness issue. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
11. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1224. 
12. Roe, 410 U.S. at 122. 
13. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Biackmun, 
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart constituted the majority. Justice White dis­
sented, joined by then Justice Rehnquist, who wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The 
Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Stewart wrote concurring opinions. 
14. The only part of the District Court's ruling that was reversed was its failure to 
dismiss the intervening physician's complaint. Id., 410 U.S. at 166. 
15. The Court did not decide whether the District Court erred in withholding 
injunctive relief because it assumed that the Texas prosecutorial authorities "will give 
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, addressed eight 
matters of general interest pertaining to abortion policy: (1) ancient 
attitudes about abortions,16 (2) the Hippocratic Oath,17 (3) the 
common law,18 (4) the English statutory law,19 (5) the American 
law,2° (6) the position of the American Medical Association,21 (7) 
the position of the American Public Health Association,22 and (8) 
the position of the American Bar Association.23 In considering 
these eight matters, the Court demonstrated a willingness to take 
into account not only traditional notions of individual privacy 
rights, but also the positions of the medical and scientific 
community. 
Justice Blackmun also considered the reasons advanced to "ex­
plain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 
19th century and to justify their continued existence."24 He dis­
missed, almost immediately, the first reason, "a Victorian social 
concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct,"25 by reciting that 
full credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are 
unconstitutional." Id. at 166. 
16. Id. at 130. Ancient religion did not ban abortions. Id. In a later part of his 
opinion Justice Blackmun stated that the Stoics thought that life does not begin until 
live birth. Id. at 160. 
17. Id at 130-32. Though the Hippocratic Oath provided that "I will not give to a 
woman a pessary to procure an abortion" it was the standard of some, but not all of the 
physicians of the time. Id. at 131. 
18. Id. at 132-36. It was doubtful that "abortion was ever firmly established as a 
common law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus." Id. at 136. A 
quick fetus is a fetus that has made "its first recognizable movement ... in utero." Id. at 
132. 
19. Id. at 136-38. The present English statute "permits a physician, without the 
concurrence of others, to terminate pregnancy where he is of the good faith opinion 
that the abortion is immediately necessary to save the life or to protect grave perma­
nent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman." Id. at 138. 
20. Id. at 138-41. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution and throughout 
the majority of the nineteenth century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than 
under most American statutes currently in effect. "Even later, the law continued for 
some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy." Id. at 141. 
21. Id. at 141-44. The American Medical Association has taken the position that 
"abortion is a medical procedure that should be performed by a licensed physician in an 
accredited hospital only after consultation with two other physicians and in conformity 
with state law and that no party to the procedure should be required to violate person­
ally held moral principles." Id. at 143. 
22. Id. at 144-46. The American Public Health Association has taken the position 
that abortions should be performed by physicians or osteopaths who are licensed to 
practice and who have adequate training. Id. at 146. 
23. Id. at 146-47. The American Bar Association approved the Uniform Abor­
tion Act. Id. at 146. 
24. Id. at 147. 
25. Id. at 148-49. 
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neither the courts nor commentators have taken that position seri­
ously, and it is not a proper state concern.26 The second reason 
merited more attention. That reason was that when anti-abortion 
laws were first enacted, the woman's health was a major concern of 
the state because of the hazardous nature of the abortion proce­
dure.27 Though modern medical techniques have mitigated that 
concern, "the State retains a definite interest in protecting the wo­
man's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late 
stage of pregnancy."28 The third reason extended the concept that 
the later the abortion occurs in the pregnancy the greater the dan­
ger.29 While not attempting a determination of when life begins,3° 
the Court said that "[i]n assessing the State's interest, recognition 
may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential 
life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection 
of the pregnant woman alone."31 
The next section of the opinion dealt with Jane Roe's main ar­
gument that the Texas statutes denied her a right of privacy, which 
included an absolute right to "terminate her pregnancy at whatever 
time ... and for whatever reason, she alone chooses."32 The Court 
had no difficulty deciding that the right of privacy, whether it be 
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment (which the Court es­
poused), or in the Ninth Amendment (espoused by the District 
Court), included "the abortion decision."33 In essence the holding 
of Roe has two elements, and is as follows: 
(1) the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution encompasses a 
right of privacy;34 and 
(2) that right of privacy encompasses the right to abort an un­
26. See id. at 148. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. at 150. 
29. [d. 
30. See id. But cf the Court's reference to "prenatal life." [d. at 155-56. 
31. [d. at 150. 
32. [d. at 153; see id. at 120, 152-56. 
33. [d. at 154. The Court stressed the importance of the relationship between the 
patient and her physician. [d. at 153, 156. 
34. [d. at 152. The Court relied primarily on Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), 
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), 
and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) for that proposition. Roe, 410 U.S. at 
152-53. 
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wanted pregnancy.35 
The Court recognized, however, that "a State may properly as­
sert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining med­
ical standards, and in protecting potentiallife."36 Hence, the right 
of personal privacy "is not unqualified and must be considered 
against important state interests in regulation."37 Referring to re­
cent abortion cases that struck down anti-abortion statutes, the 
Court said that it "generally scrutinized the State's interests in pro­
tecting health and potential life and have concluded that neither 
interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a physi­
cian and his patient might decide that she have an abortion in the 
early stages of pregnancy."38 
Part IX of the opinion set forth the Court's response to Texas's 
argument that, because a "person" is created at conception, the 
State has an interest in protecting that person during the length of 
the pregnancy.39 The Court first noted, "[N]o case could be cited 
that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Four­
teenth Amendment"40 and "[t]he Constitution does not define 'per­
son' in so many words."41 The Court further observed that 
"throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal 
abortion practices were far freer than they are today, [which] per­
suades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, does not include the unborn."42 Not being completely 
satisfied with that response to the State, but also not wishing to 
consider the "difficult question of when life begins"43 or enter that 
"most sensitive and difficult"44 area of discussion, the Court ex­
plored the point at which the State has such a compelling interest in 
protecting "the mother or that of potential human life"45 that the 
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. The Court relied upon Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 
(1927) and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) to establish that the Court has 
refused to recognize that this right is unlimited. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. 
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. In fact, Justice Blackmun considered the outline of 
the State's interests in abortion (see infra text accompanying note 53) the "holding" of 
the case. Id. at 165. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 156. 
39. Id. at 156-62. 
40. Id. at 157. 
41. /d. 
42. Id. at 158. 
43. See id. at 159. 
44. See id. at 160. 
45. Id. at 159. 
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State might become "significantly involved."46 It was here that the 
Court used two words which paved the way for its related "trimes­
ter framework"47 set forth in Part X. The Court stated that the 
fetus must be "viable48 or at least quick,"49 in order for the State to 
invoke rules and regulations about protecting the life, or the poten­
tial life of the fetus-though adding the caveat that "the unborn 
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole 
sense."50 
In Part X of its opinion the Court developed what it later 
called its "rigid trimester framework,"51 which identifies the point 
in pregnancy after which a state "may regulate the abortion proce­
dure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the pres­
ervation and protection of maternal health." 
This means ... that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this 
"compelling" point, the attending physician, in consultation with 
his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, 
that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be 
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be ef­
fectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.52 
Part XI of the opinion summarized the Court's position: 
For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester 
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the med­
ical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. For 
the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimes­
ter, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the 
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in 
ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. For the 
stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in 
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate and 
even proscribe abortion except where it is necessary, in appropri­
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
46. [d. 
47. More is said about the "trimester framework" in this paper. See infra text 
accompanying note 51; see infra notes 74 and 149. 
48. "Viable" means being able to live outside the mother's womb. Roe, 410 U.S. 
at 163; see infra note 93. 
49. [d. at 161. "Quick" comes from the English statutes that made abortion after 
"quickening" an offense. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952 
(1992). 
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
51. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873; see also infra Part II. D. 
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
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the mother. 53 
Measured by these standards, the Court concluded that the 
Texas statute, which permitted an abortion only for the purpose of 
saving the life of the mother, "swe[pt] too broadly," and struck the 
statute down on due process grounds.54 
II. SUPREME COURT PROGENY OF ROE 
As with most judicial decisions, post-Roe embellishments have 
had the effect of both expanding and contracting the scope of the 
decision. An examination of Roe's progeny helps to distinguish the 
essential Roe holding from later embellishments - in other words, 
to separate the Roe wheat from the progeny chaff. 
A. Separation of Church and State 
As discussed above, Part IX of the Roe majority opinion dealt 
with Texas's argument that a "person" is created at conception and 
the State therefore has an interest in protecting that person during 
the length of the pregnancy.55 The Court recognized that the State 
does have an interest in protecting potential life, but the Court 
stopped short of determining when, exactly, "life" begins.56 It 
seems that the Court, in terming the "life" question "sensitive and 
difficult," was nodding to the essentially sectarian and personal na­
ture of such a determination.57 In the following cases it is clear that 
the Court has continually reserved judgment on the question of 
when "life" begins - and has not allowed legislators to overstep this 
boundary, either. 
In Maher v. Roe,58 the Court upheld governmental regulations 
that withheld public funds for non-therapeutic abortions, but al­
lowed payments for medical services related to childbirth, permit­
ting a government to favor childbirth over abortion through the 
allocation of other public resources, such as hospitals and medical 
staff.59 Under Maher the government may, in other words, make a 
value judgment to support birth over abortion through various in­
53. Id. at 164. 
54. Id. at 164. 
55. Id. at 156-62. 
56. Id. at 159-60. 
57. Id. at 162 ("[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may 
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake."). 
58. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
59. The Court opined that Roe implied no limitation on a state's authority to 
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion. Id. at 474. 
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centives, but the determination of what is "life" must be left to the 
medical community, divorced from any sectarian position. Thus, in 
Colautti v. Franklin, the Court struck down the Pennsylvania Abor­
tion Control Act, which governed the determination of viability.60 
The Court made clear that neither the legislature nor the courts 
may proclaim the ascertainment of viability-the viability determi­
nation must be a matter for the responsible attending physician.61 
Sixteen years after Roe and with four changes in its composi­
tion,62 the Court sustained the principle of the separation of church 
and state in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services ,63 where it con­
sidered certain provisions of a Missouri abortion statute. Chief Jus­
tice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, which refused to rule 
on the constitutionality of the statute's preamble proclaiming that 
life began at conception.64 The Court determined that it need not 
consider the constitutionality of the preamble for essentially two 
reasons. First, Roe does not impose a limitation on a state's author­
ity to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and 
the preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value judg­
ment.65 The second reason given by the Court was that until the 
courts of Missouri have used the preamble in some litigated matter 
it is premature for the Supreme Court to interpret it.66 
The opinion declared that provisions of the statute forbidding 
the use of public funds, employees, or public facilities for the pur­
pose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion 
60. 439 U.S. 379, 380 (1979). The ostensible ground was vagueness, but the Court 
made it clear that the trimester framework incorporated only one definition of viabil­
ity-the Court's-as the Court forbade states to decide that a certain objective indica­
tor (be it weeks of gestation, fetal weight, or any other) should govern the definition of 
viability. Id. at 388-89. 
61. Id. 
62. The Roe Court consisted of Justice Blackmun, Chief Justice Burger and Jus­
tices Douglas, Stuart, Powell, Brennan, and Marshall in the majority, and Justices Rehn­
quist and White in dissent. The Webster Court consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia in the majority, and Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun in the dissent. Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented 
in part. 
63. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
64. The preamble to the statute set forth findings that "the life of each human 
being begins at conception" and that "unborn children have protectable interests in life, 
health and well-being;" and that all Missouri state laws be "interpreted to provide un­
born children with the same rights enjoyed by other persons subject to the Federal 
Constitution and Supreme Court precedents." Id. at 501. 
65. Id. at 504-07. 
66. Id. at 506-07. 
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which was not necessary to save her life were unconstitutional,67 
and found constitutional the portion of the statute requiring a phy­
sician, prior to performing an abortion on a woman he has reason 
to believe is twenty or more weeks pregnant, to ascertain whether 
the fetus is viable by performing such medical examination and 
other tests as are necessary to make a finding of the fetus's gesta­
tional age, weight, and lung maturity.68 The Court refused to grant 
the request of the Missouri Attorney General, counsel for the ap­
pellees and the United States, to overrule Roe v. Wade. 69 The 
Court would not do so because the case at bar was distinguishable 
from Roe.7° Missouri in this case determined that "viability is the 
point at which [the State's] interest in potential life must be safe­
guarded."71 In Roe, Texas "criminalized ... all abortions, except 
when the mother's life was at stake."72 
Only Justices White and Kennedy joined the part of Rehn­
quist's opinion dealing with the viability test. That "plurality"73 
found that the gestational provision of the statute created a pre­
sumption of viability at twenty weeks that could be rebutted only 
by test results indicating that the fetus was not viable.74 Roe, they 
said, held that the State had an interest in the potentiality of human 
life.75 However, the plurality argued that the State's compelling in­
terest in human life, recognized in Roe, should extend throughout 
67. The statute made it unlawful to use public funds, employees, or facilities for 
the purpose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion which was not 
necessary to save her life. The Court found that the statute was not unconstitutional, as 
the State was not mandated to "commit any resources to facilitating abortions even if it 
could turn a profit by doing so." Id. at 511. The Court also said that, "The Constitution 
does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a 
preference for normal childbirth." Webster, 492 U.S. at 511 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 
U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). 
68. Id. at 513-21. 
69. Id. at 521. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 521. 
73. Justice Blackmun refers to Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy, as the 
"plurality." See id. at 537 and in seriatim throughout his opinion. Justice O'Connor 
also uses the term. See id. at 525 and in seriatim. It is also found in the Syllabus. See id. 
at 495. Justice Scalia joined in all of the "plurality" opinion, except the section discuss­
ing viability, because he agreed with Justice Blackmun that "it effectively would over­
rule Roe v. Wade." Id. at 532. He wanted Roe overruled, but explicitly. Id. 
74. It was in Part II D of their opinion, dealing with protection to the fetus, that 
the plurality took a swing at the "trimester framework" dealing with the mother's 
health: "the rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notions of a Constitution 
cast in general terms, as ours is ...." See id. at 518. 
75. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
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pregnancy rather than come into existence only at the point of via­
bility.76 Hence, the plurality argued that Roe's viability require­
ment should be abandoned.77 Having said that, the plurality rested 
on the medical nature of the viability determination: "The Missouri 
testing requirement here is reasonably designed to ensure that 
abortions are not performed where the fetus is viable-an end 
which all concede is legitimate-and that is sufficient to sustain its 
constitutionality."78 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
concurred in part and dissented in part. The dissent was directed 
mainly against the preamble of the statute and its viability-testing 
provisions.79 Blackmun concluded his opinion with the following 
words: "For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. 
For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to con­
trol their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and 
a chill wind blows. "80 
Justice Blackmun severely criticized the "plurality":81 "Never 
in my memory has a plurality announced a judgment of this Court 
that so foments disregard for the law and for our standing deci­
sions.... Nor in my memory has a plurality gone about its business 
in such a deceptive fashion."82 The charge of deception must have 
come from his conclusion that the plurality was trying to overrule 
Roe without specifically so stating.83 Indeed, in a recent article, 
Dawn E. Johnson stated that "the Court's 1989 decision in Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Services suggests that the Court was at most 
one judicial appointment away from overruling Roe and allowing 
states to criminalize abortion."84 But it was the plurality's position 
that state legislatures had the right to provide for viability testing, 
particularly since Roe held that the State had an interest in the po­
76. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519. 
77. Id. at 518-19. 
78. Id. at 520. 
79. ld. at 537-56. It is not clear from a reading of Justice Blackmun's opinion with 
which part of the Court's judgment he concurred. The preamble's constitutionality was 
determined in the majority opinion, and the viability-testing part was addressed in the 
plurality opinion. While his opinion does not explicitly so state, it could be concluded 
that his concurrence was with Part II C of the plurality opinion. See id. at 539 n.l. 
80. ld. at 560. 

8l. Justices White and Kennedy, in addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist. 

82. Jd. at 538. 
83. Id. at 537. 
84. Dawn E. Johnson, Functional Departmentalizationism and Nonjudicial Inter­
pretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 
105, 145 (2004). 
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tentiality of human life.85 This appears to be a logical extension of 
Roe, well within the confines of the argument that the courts should 
not engage in such sectarian pursuits as attempting to determine 
when life begins.86 
Adherence to the principle of the separation of church and 
state is reinforced in the Court's later, landmark case Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, discussed below. First, we turn to an intro­
duction of other key elements of the Roe decision. 
B. Grist for the Litigation Mill 
Roe held that the point at which the State's interest in protect­
ing potential life becomes compelling is the point of "viability,"87 
which the Court determined occurs at approximately seven months, 
though possibly as early as twenty-four weeks.88 However, this de­
termination of when, exactly, "viability" occurs was incidental and 
not intrinsic to the holding that the State's interest becomes com­
pelling at viability. The following cases demonstrate that what con­
stitutes "viability" is a fluid question, depending on medical 
advances, that may be debated continually in the years to come, 
and that an overruling of Roe is not necessary to allow such changes 
in the understanding of viability. Roe also held that the point at 
which the State's interest in protecting the health of the mother be­
comes compelling is "approximately the end of the first trimes­
ter."89 But this "rigid trimester framework" has, similarly, proven 
inessential to the Roe holding. Indeed, the Court's move from the 
trimester framework to the "substantial burden" test in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey demonstrates as much. The seeds of the sub­
stantial burden test were planted in the cases leading up to the 
Casey decision. 
At issue in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Inc., (Akron I), was a city ordinance requiring that all abor­
tions after the first trimester be performed in a hospital; that the 
attending physician must obtain the consent of a parent of a minor 
under 15 years of age, or a court order; that the attending physician 
inform the patient of the status of her pregnancy, the development 
of the fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical and emo­
85. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
86. See infra text accompanying notes 164-69. 
87. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
88. Id. at 160. 
89. Id. at 163. 
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tional complications that may result from an abortion, the availabil­
ity of agencies to provide her with assistance and information 
regarding birth control, adoption, and childbirth; a twenty-four 
hour waiting period after the physician receives a signed consent 
from the patient; and that the fetal remains be disposed of in a "hu­
mane and sanitary manner."90 The ordinance was struck down as 
unconstitutional.91 
The Court's opinion began with a reaffirmation of Roe on the 
basis of stare decisis.92 The main thrust of the opinion was that 
under Roe the State has two interests in the area of abortions­
first, protection of the potentiality of human life,93 and second, pro­
tection of the mother's health.94 In its analysis, the Court deter­
mined that the ordinances imposed a significant burden on a 
woman's access to an abortion without any showing of necessity to 
meet the State's interests.95 Though the Akron I Court specifically 
reaffirmed Roe,96 the Casey Court overruled Akron I to the extent 
that it was inconsistent with Roe's statement that a "State has a 
legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the un­
born."97 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White 
and Rehnquist,98 forecast her displeasure with the trimester frame­
work of Roe.99 She initially wrote, "The decision of the Court to­
day graphically illustrates why the trimester approach is a 
completely unprincipled method of accommodating the conflicting 
90. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. (Akron I), 462 
U.S. 416, 422-24 (1983). 
91. Id. at 431, 452. 
92. Id. at 419-20. Justice Powell wrote the six member majority opinion. Powell 
described Roe v. Wade as holding "the right of privacy, grounded in the concept of 
personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, encompasses a woman's right to decide 
whether to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 419. 
93. Id. at 428. Pursuant to Roe, this interest becomes compelling only at viabil­
ity-the point at which the fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the 
mother's womb." Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
94. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 428-29. Pursuant to Roe, the health of the mother does 
not become compelling until the end of the first trimester. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
95. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 428. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White and then­
Justice Rehnquist, dissented, saying, inter alia, that "[h ]ealth-related factors that may 
legitimately be considered by the State go well beyond what various medical organiza­
tions have to say about the physical safety of a particular procedure." Id. at 467. 
96. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
97. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992), infra 
Part II. D, in a joint opinion written by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. 
98. Justices White and Rehnquist were the two dissenters in Roe. Justice 
O'Connor, however, would go on to author the Casey opinion, affirming the Roe hold­
ing while doing away with the trimester framework. 
99. Akron 1,462 U.S. at 452. 
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personal rights and compelling state interests that are involved in 
the abortion context."lOO At the urging of Justice Blackmun she 
changed the word "unprincipled" to "unworkable" because "she 
wanted to avoid anything that even indirectly appeared to be an ad 
hominem attack."lOl 
Vexation was beginning to show on the Court with the direc­
tion in which Roe's progeny were taking the Roe holding, though 
not necessarily with the holding of Roe itself. In Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Court 
struck down Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Statute, which con­
tained six requirements for an abortion to be permitted.102 In his 
Thornburgh dissent, Chief Justice Burger wrote, "The extent to 
which the Court has departed from the limitations expressed in Roe 
is readily apparent."103 Also dissenting, Justice White wrote, "The 
Court engages not in constitutional interpretation, but in the unre­
strained imposition of its own, extraconstitutional value prefer­
ences."104 Justice O'Connor (with whom then Justice Rehnquist 
joined) wrote, "This Court's abortion decisions have already 
worked a major distortion in the Court's constitutional jurispru­
dence. "105 Although the Thornburgh Court specifically reaffirmed 
Roe,106 as it had in Akron I, the Casey Court overruled Thornburgh 
to the extent that it was inconsistent with Roe's statement that a 
state has a legitimate interest in promoting the life, or potential life, 
of the unborn.l07 
Hodgson v. Minnesota 108 answered what appeared to be a 
100. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 144 (Henry Holt & 
Co. 2005). 
101. ld. 
102. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 772 (1986). The requirements were 1) that women be advised that medical 
assistance may be available, 2) that women be advised that the child's father is responsi­
ble for financial assistance, 3) that the physician inform the woman of detrimental 
physical and psychological effects and of all medical risks of abortions, 4) that women 
be advised of certain reporting requirements, 5) that women be advised of provisions 
governing the degree of care for post-viability abortions, and 6) that a second physician 
is present during an abortion. Id. at 763-64. The last provision, about the second physi­
cian, was struck down only because it contained no exception for an emergency. Id. at 
770-71. 
103. Id. at 783. 
104. ld. at 794. 
105. ld. at 814. 
106. ld. at 759. 
107. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992); see infra 
Part II. D. 
108. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
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question of limited proportions with a complex set of opinions cov­
ering a wide range of subjects. The Minnesota statute at issue pro­
vided that, with certain exceptions, no female under the age of 
eighteen years could obtain an abortion unless both of her parents 
were notified, and even then a forty-eight hour waiting period was 
required.109 The statute did provide for a "judicial bypass," by 
which the minor could seek a court order finding that she possessed 
sufficient maturity to make the decision of whether to abort her 
pregnancy without parental notification. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the two-parent notice re­
quirement unconstitutional because it was an unreasonable re­
straint upon a young woman's liberty. The notice requirement with 
the judicial bypass provision, however, was constitutional and saved 
the statute from being declared wholly invalid.1l0 On appeal, the 
Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision, holding that the two­
parent notice requirement without judicial bypass was unconstitu­
tional.1 11 Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices White and Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. The dissent took the position that the require­
ment of notice to both parents was constitutional even without the 
judicial bypass provision.112 
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion.113 Jus­
tice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, wrote a 
separate concurring and dissenting opinion, primarily clarifying that 
he thought that the bypass did not save the statute because the pro­
vision itself was unconstitutional,114 and that the forty-eight hour 
waiting period burdened the rights of minors.115 
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.116 He noted the fragmentation over abortion 
cases into which the Court was drifting, which prompted him to 
write: 
The random and unpredictable results of our consequently un­
channeled individual views make it increasingly evident, Term af­
109. [d. at 422; MINN. STAT. § 144 343(2)-(7) (1998). 
110. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 431. 
111. /d. at 422-23. 
112. [d. at 500. 
113. Justice O'Connor agreed that a woman's decision to conceive or bear a child 
is a component part of her liberty, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause. [d. at 458. 
114. [d. at 461-62. 
115. [d. at 467. 
116. [d. at 479-80. 
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ter Term, that the tools for this job are not to be found in the 
lawyer's-and hence not in the judge's-workbox. I continue to 
dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and 
from the illusion that we have authority to do SO.117 
Justice Scalia's words notwithstanding, Roe has so far proven 
able to overarch such debate and encompass a wide variety of 
views. Differing determinations of the terms "viability" and "sub­
stantial obstacle" do not require an overruling of Roe. This be­
comes most clear in the Court's later, landmark case Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, discussed below. First, we turn to an intro­
duction of a final key element of the Roe decision. 
C. Theories of Privacy Right 
Roe v. Wade held that a state statute that made it a crime to 
obtain, or attempt to obtain, an abortion, except for the purpose of 
saving the life or protecting the health of the mother, was unconsti­
tutional.118 The rationale of the case was that liberty, which is guar­
anteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, is broad enough to include 
a right of privacy.119 The right of privacy includes the right, though 
not unqualified,120 to decide whether to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy.121 
Wilson Huhn points out that the present Court122 is split into 
two schools of thought concerning the constitutional basis for the 
right of privacy, which is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitu­
tion.123 One school of thought124 takes the position that the right of 
privacy is not defined by reference to specific American traditions, 
but rather by reference to society'S "emerging awareness" of the 
effect of laws on people's lives,125 The other school of thought126 
117. Id. at 480. 
118. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
119. Id. at 152-53. 
120. The "state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in 
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life." Id. at 154-55. 
121. Id. at 153. 
122. The recent replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist with Chief Justice Rob­
erts is not factored into this theory, and Chief Justice Roberts's appointment to the 
Court is too recent to place him in one or the other school of thought on this issue. 
123. See Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Poten­
tial in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 65, 76 (2003). 
124. Consisting of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and 
Ginsburg. 
125. Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, Huhn bases 
his conclusion not on the fact that sodomy had a history of approval, but that in this 
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sees tradition as the only legitimate source of our unen:lmerated 
rights.127 In other words, six members look not to whether privacy 
has been considered a constitutionally guaranteed right, but to 
whether privacy is thought of as "a general right to make 'personal 
and intimate choices' that are 'central to personal dignity and au­
tonomy.' "128 Huhn writes: 
[I]n Lawrence the majority of the Supreme Court embraced an 
expansive definition of the 'right to privacy,' adopting the pas­
sage from the plurality opinion in Casey that people are free to 
make 'intimate and personal choices' not because these choices 
are 'traditional' rights, but because these choices are 'central to 
personal dignity and autonomy .... [I]t has now been accepted by 
six members of the Supreme Court as expressing their under­
standing of the right to privacy. By focusing on the effect that 
the law has on a person's personal, intimate choices, this doctri­
nal shift legitimizes the consequentialist approach that Justice 
Blackmun employed in Roe in applying the right to privacy.129 
Indeed, the 6-3 division among the justices into these two 
schools of thought regarding the right to privacy suggests that a ma­
jority of the current Court would not vote to overrule Roe,130 
D. 	 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
(1992) 
The foregoing arguments regarding why Roe v. Wade will not 
likely be overruled in the near future are further grounded in the 
country there is "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to 
sex." Huhn, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. at 76, (quoting from Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558,571 (2003». 
126. 	 Consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
127. This position is best illustrated in note 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (upholding a California statute which 
denied a biological father a right to establish his paternity of a child conceived by his 
sexual partner, a woman who was married to another man). The essence of the position 
is represented by the following words: "Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be 
that) of leaving judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a 
rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no 
rule of law at all." Id. at 127 n.6. This is consistent with Justice Scalia's well known 
description of California's traditional in-state service rule to the effect that "its valida­
tion is its pedigree." See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990). 
128. 	 Huhn, supra note 123, at 73. 
129. 	 Id. at 76-77. 
130. Even if both Roberts and O'Connor's replacement join the school of tradi­
tion, the split would still be 5-4 in favor of upholding Roe on the grounds that abortion 
is a privacy right not specifically defined by tradition. 
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Supreme Court's holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, where the Court reviewed several amend­
ments to a Pennsylvania statute. l3l The amendments required 1) 
that a woman seeking an abortion give consent in writing prior to 
the abortion, and that she be supplied with certain information at 
least twenty-four hours prior to the abortion; 2) that if the woman 
was a minor, the informed consent had to be given by one parent;132 
and 3) that married women were required to sign a statement that 
they had obtained their husband's consent.133 These three require­
ments were excused in the event of a "medical emergency."134 
Before the Act took effect, the petitioners (five abortion clinics and 
a physician) sought declaratory and injunctive relief in a United 
States District Court. The court held the Pennsylvania statute un­
constitutional and permanently enjoined. its enforcement.135 The 
Third Circuit upheld all of the statutory restrictions except the hus­
band notification provision.136 At oral argument before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that none of the State's re­
quirements could be upheld without overruling Roe v. Wade.!37 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter wrote the major portions 
of the Court's "joint" opinion.!38 While they acknowledged that 
the Court's "decisions after Roe cast doubt upon the meaning and 
reach of its holding,"139 they did not agree with the petitioners that 
Roe must be overruled to uphold the amendments in question,140 
although they did not uphold all of the amendments. "After con­
sidering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, 
principles of institutional integrity and the rule of stare decisis we 
conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be re­
tained and once again reaffirmed."141 
The authors of the joint opinion lost no time in making clear 
just what they considered was the "essential holding" of Roe v. 
131. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
132. The amendment also provided a judicial bypass provision. Id. at 844. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. A fifth amendment required abortion facilities meet certain reporting 
and record-keeping requirements. Id. This amendment is not addressed in this Article. 
135. [d. at 845. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 845. 
138. Id. at 843. 
139. Id. at 845. They added that Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted "that he would 
overrule Roe and adopt the rational relationship test as the sole criterion of constitu­
tionality." Id. 
140. Id. at 845. 
141. Id. at 845-46. 
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Wade. It contained three major points:142 
First, recognition of the right of a woman to choose to have an 
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interfer­
ence from the State. Before viability the State's interests are not 
strong enough to support prohibition of abortion or the imposi­
tion of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to 
elect the procedure. Second, a confirmation of the State's power 
to restrict abortions after fetal viability if the law contains excep­
tions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health. 
And third, the State has legitimate interests from the outset of 
the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life 
of the fetus that may become a child.143 
In its reaffirmation of Roe, the joint opinion made clear that 
"[a]lthough Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense 
proven 'unworkable,' representing as it does a simple limitation be­
yond which a state law is unenforceable."144 The "workability" of 
the Roe holding was an essential part of the Court's stare decisis 
determination. Admittedly, the Court also emphasized the effects 
that overruling Roe could have on the public and on the Court's 
legitimacy: 
[I]t is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some free­
dom to terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic de­
cision in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis which we 
cannot now repudiate. The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, 
however, that from the outset the State cannot show its concern 
for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal develop­
ment the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the 
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be 
restricted.145 
The Court stated, almost with a plea, that: 
A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing 
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost 
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legiti­
macy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is 
therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original 
142. [d. at 846. 
143. The authors said that this was the "most central principle" of the case, a rule 
of law and a component of liberty that they could not renounce. See id. at 871. Later in 
the joint opinion they said that "before that time [viability] the woman has a right to 
choose to terminate her pregnancy." [d. at 870. 
144. [d. at 855 (citations omitted). 
145. [d. at 869. 
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decision, and we do so today.146 
The joint opinion has been criticized for its appeal to the "dam­
age to the Court's legitimacy" that would result from an overruling 
of Roe. Michael Stokes Paulsen says: 
This is an astonishing proposition. What if the thing that makes 
a decision a "watershed" is that it was a grotesque departure 
from the Constitution-a massive, unfounded judicial coup d'etat 
taken in the name of the Constitution? The notion that the more 
dramatic a precedent's departure from the Constitution, the 
more tenaciously the Court should cling to it-lest the people 
recognize the departure for the lawlessness it is-is positively 
repulsive.147 
This may be so, but the Court's upholding of Roe was not pre­
mised solely on the desire to avoid the problems overruling Roe 
would generate; the Court felt the Roe holding was still practicable. 
Casey's holding is profound, though not as broad as its 169 page 
length might indicate.148 It simply rejected the so-called "trimester 
framework" of Roe.149 The Court used the essential holding of Roe 
to craft an updated method of balancing the State's interests against 
those of the mother.150 In Part IV of the opinion, the Court re­
placed the trimester framework with the "undue burden" test, 
which seeks to determine whether a state has exceeded its constitu­
tional authority to place some limits on a woman's right to choose 
in abortion cases.151 
146. Id. 
147. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1031 (2003). 
148. What the Court in Casey referred to as Roe's "essential holding" (see supra 
text accompanying note 142-43), is really the rationale for the Casey holding. In order 
to overrule Roe both its holding and its rationale would have to be discarded by the 
Court. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73, 878-79 (1992). 
149. The trimester framework of Roe was, in essence, that state legislatures were 
free to place restrictions on the right of a woman to choose an abortion after approxi­
mately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, but that prior to that time the preg­
nant woman was free to make her own informed choice. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. 
150. Id. at 873, 878. There had been discontent with the so-called trimester 
framework for some time. Justice White in his dissent in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99 (1976), wrote that the trimester framework had 
caused the Court to serve as the country's "ex officio medical board with powers to 
approve or disapprove medical and operative practice and standards throughout the 
United States." 
151. The trimester framework was found to be "unsound in principle and un­
workable in practice" by Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for himself and Justice Ken­
nedy in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (citation 
omitted). 
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The "undue burden" test was considered "the appropriate 
means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitu­
tionally protected liberty."152 Under this test, if the purpose or ef­
fect of abortion legislation is to place a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus, it will be 
held unconstitutional, as an "undue burden" on the pregnant wo­
man.153 The joint opinion stated: 
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion 
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a sub­
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because 
the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential 
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not 
hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in 
potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice 
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legiti­
mate ends.154 
The Court reiterated the sanctity of the woman's right to 
choose,155 but emphasized that the State had strong interests in pro­
tecting the life of the unborn: 
Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue 
her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the 
State is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is 
thoughtful and informed. Even in the earliest stages of preg­
nancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to en­
courage her to know that there are philosophic and social 
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of 
continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are proce­
dures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as 
well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses 
to raise the child herself.156 
In sum, the "trimester framework," in the Court's view, needed 
replacing for it did not sufficiently recognize the State's interest in 
the area of abortions.157 The terms "substantial obstacle" and 
"nonviable fetus" will be grist for the litigation mill for some time 
152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. at 877. 
155. [d. at 872. 
156. [d. 
157. [d. at 876. 
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to come.158 The need for construction, however, is not a ground for 
overruling an opinion that leaves room for interpretation. 
In Part IV of the opinion, the Court also addressed that aspect 
of Roe v. Wade that makes it an anathema to large segments of the 
Judeo-Christian community-that is, the question when life be­
gins.159 Many people believe that life begins at conception, and 
that giving a woman a choice to abort a pregnancy is giving her a 
right to commit murder.160 The authors of the Casey joint opinion 
realized that they were at "the point where much criticism ha[ d] 
been directed at Roe."161 Casey did not go so far as to attempt an 
answer to the question of when life begins, but repeated that it was 
at the point at which the fetus became "viable" or "quick" that the 
State had an interest in imposing regulation on abortions.162 The 
joint opinion attempted a definition of "viability" as "the time at 
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a 
life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the sec­
ond life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protec­
tion that now overrides the rights of the woman."163 This 
explanation of when life begins is no more definite than that at­
tempted by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade. But this must be 
acceptable. It is not the function of the Supreme Court or any court 
in a country that maintains a separation of church and state,164 to 
make judicial pronouncements upon non-secular matters.165 Would 
not the "realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life 
outside the womb"166 encompass religious beliefs, moral convic­
tions, "biological appreciations,"167 and just plain "gut" reactions as 
158. The joint opinion's definition of "viability" will help. See supra note 48. 
159. [d. at 869-79. 
160. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctf., 512 U.S. 753, 787 (1994) (listing the 
phrase "God Calls It Murder" as an example of one of the phrases held up on a sign at 
a protest outside an abortion clinic). 
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. 
162. [d. at 870; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-61 (1973); see supra text accompa­
nying notes 48-49. 
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
164. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,390-97 (1979) (striking down a statute 
which governed the determination of viability; see also Casey, 505 U.S at 949 (Rehn­
quist, c.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
166. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (referring to a position taken in Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. at 163). 
167. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 763 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "For those 
who share an abiding moral or religious conviction (or for that matter, simply a biologi­
cal appreciation) that abortion is the taking of a human life, there is no option but to 
persuade women, one by one, not to make that choice." [d. 
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to whether life begins at conception? 
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we sup­
pose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and 
spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its ear­
liest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to 
our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our 
decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to man­
date our own moral code.168 
It is sufficient for courts to allow citizens to make their own 
decisions as to whether abortion is a sin-an inherently sectarian 
determination. There is nothing in Roe v. Wade that requires an 
abortion if the pregnant woman, for any reason, does not want it.169 
Regarding the right to privacy, the authors of the joint opinion 
reiterated that the constitutional protection of the woman's deci­
sion to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents deprivation 
of "life, liberty or property." The Court intended to place emphasis 
on "liberty."17o Justice Scalia wrote a twenty-two page dissent, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and 
Thomas. l7l In his dissent, Scalia made an astounding declaration 
about his version of the basis of the right of a pregnant woman to 
abort her pregnancy: "liberty includes only those practices, defined 
at the most specific level, that were protected against government 
interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amend­
ment was ratified."I72 Since abortion was not being regulated at the 
end of the Civil War, it was not encompassed by the word "liberty," 
according to Justice Scalia. As discussed earlier, 173 however, the 
justices who would take this traditionalist approach to the right of 
privacy are in the minority, even if both Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice O'Connor's replacement take the traditionalist approachY4 
168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850-51. 
169. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (concluding the abortion decision is a personal 
right). The remarks of Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproduc­
tive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989), to the effect that Roe represents a "self­
awarded sovereignty over a field where it has little proper business since the answers to 
most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridical" are completely off the 
mark. 
170. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
171. [d. at 979. 
172. [d. at 981. 
173. See supra Part II. C. 
174. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg would presumably 
remain in the "emerging awareness" school. 
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Casey therefore encapsulated the theories found in Roe and its 
progeny regarding the separation of church and state, the right to 
privacy, and the concept that Roe is a working framework within 
which "viability" and "substantial obstacle" may be developed. 
E. 	 A Blueprint For Overruling A Supreme Court Precedent: 
Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 
Lawrence v. Texas175 is not a progeny of Roe v. Wade, but it is 
discussed in this article because it provides a list of factors that the 
Court will consider in overruling a prior Supreme Court case. In 
Lawrence, the Court declared unconstitutional a Texas statute mak­
ing it a crime for two persons of the same gender to engage in cer­
tain intimate sexual conduct.176 The opinion of the Court, written 
by Justice Kennedy, proclaimed that the Texas statute was unconsti­
tutional and that a precedent, Bowers v. Hardwick,l77 was over­
ruled.178 Bowers had held that a state law criminalizing sodomy as 
applied to homosexuals did not violate substantive due process.179 
Justice Kennedy assigned eight reasons for overruling Bowers: 
(1) the Bowers Court misinterpreted the issue;180 (2) legislators' at­
titudes had changed;181 (3) two Supreme Court decisions had cast 
Bowers' holding in doubt;182 (4) in the United States, criticism of 
Bowers had been "substantial and continuing, disapproving of its 
reasoning in all respects ... the courts of five states ha[ d] declined 
to follow it";183 (5) the European Court of Human Rights did not 
follow it;184 (6) it could not be saved by stare decisis;185 (7) it "had 
175. 	 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
176. 	 In the case the men were convicted of sodomy. Id. at 563. 
177. 	 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
178. 	 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
179. 	 [d. at 567. 
180. The Bowers Court had said that the issue was whether homosexuals had the 
right to engage in sodomy; it appears that the Court completely misapprehended the 
defendants' claim of liberty. Id. at 566-67. 
181. At the time Bowers was decided twenty five states had similar laws. In 2003, 
the count was thirteen. [d. at 573. 
182. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) cast doubt on 
Bowers because it emphasized the Constitutional demands for the autonomy of the 
person in making choices concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela­
tionships, child rearing, and education. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74. Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996) cast doubt on Bowers because in that case the Court found that a 
class-based piece of legislation (directed against homosexuals, lesbians and bisexuals) 
had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
574. 
183. 	 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. 
184. 	 [d. 
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not induced detrimental reliance comparable to some instances 
where recognized individual rights are involved";186 and (8) the ra­
tionale of Bowers could not withstand careful analysis.187 Unlike in 
Lawrence, it is unlikely that a majority of the current Court will 
find that Roe's holding falls short of so many factors. Indeed, in 
Casey, the Court found insufficient indication that Roe was un­
workable precedent. 
So in this case we may enquire whether Roe's central rule has 
been found unworkable; whether the rule's limitation on state 
power could be removed without serious inequity to those who 
have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the 
society governed by it; whether the law's growth in the interven­
ing years has left Roe's central rule a doctrinal anachronism dis­
counted by society; and whether Roe's premises of fact have so 
far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central 
holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the 
issue it addressed.188 
Although there is significant public discomfort with the Roe 
holding, it will not be as simple as arguing that "life" begins at con­
ception to effect an overruling. Rather, the Court will look at myr­
iad factors and will likely be looking for such tangibles as a change 
in the attitudes of the American Medical Association and the 
American Public Health Association regarding "viability." 
III. CONCLUSION 
The resignation of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the death 
of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and resulting changes on the 
Court, have led many to question whether Roe will be overruled, 
185. "The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judg­
ments of the Court and to the stability of law. It is not, however, an inexorable com­
mand." [d. at 577 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991». "[I]t is a 
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." 
[d. (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940». 
186. [d. Justice Kennedy's exact words were: "Indeed, there has been no individ­
ual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its 
holding once there are compelling reasons to do so." [d. 
187. Justice Stevens dissented in Bowers. He wrote, "individual decisions by mar­
ried persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not 
intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate 
choices by unmarried as well as married persons." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (citation 
omitted). Justice Kennedy said that Justice Stevens was correct and the majority in 
Bowers was wrong. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
188. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 855 (1992). 
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particularly given the more conservative bent of George W. Bush 
appointees. This article offers at least four reasons why an overrul­
ing of Roe is unlikely. 
First, a majority of the Court supports an "emerging aware­
ness" theory of the right to privacy, rather than a traditionalist ap­
proach. Despite changing personnel on the Court, it is likely that 
the "emerging awareness" school, a current majority on the Court, 
would still deem abortion to be a "personal and intimate" decision, 
and thus a privacy right. 
Second, a basic premise of the Roe decision was that "viabil­
ity" should be determined according to current medical standards, 
rather than by any moral or religious notion of when "life" begins. 
This approach is not likely to change, because it is grounded in the 
foundational principle of the separation of church and state. The 
concept of personal choice is protected by that fundamental princi­
ple. It is worth noting here that we have a real impasse between the 
life-at-conception believers (the so-called "right-to-life" people), 
and those who believe that Roe v. Wade was the correct decision in 
the matter of abortion (the so-called "pro-choice" people). Over­
ruling Roe is not the way to resolve the problem. The shibboleths 
"pro choice" and "pro life" only compound the impasse. That one is 
"pro choice" does not mean that he or she is not also "pro life." 
One may be "pro life" for himself, but leave to others what choice 
they may make for themselves. Religion helps a person make a 
choice for him or herself, but religion does not give one a license to 
make that choice for another.189 
Third, the terms "substantial obstacle" and "nonviable fetus" 
will be grist for the litigation mill for some time to come. The need 
for construction, however, is not a ground for overruling an opinion 
that leaves room for interpretation. As the foregoing discussion of 
Akron and Thornburgh demonstrated, the Court is reluctant to 
overrule Roe-indeed, the Court specifically affirmed Roe-in the 
face of differing interpretations of its holding. Rather, Roe has long 
served as a framework within which the details can be fine-tuned. 
Finally, the foregoing discussion of Lawrence indicates that the 
Court would require more than differing philosophies among the 
justices regarding when "life" begins to overrule Roe. The Court 
189. Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht said that "[r]eJigion says a lot 
about who you are personally, but it says nothing about stare decisis, the commerce 
clause, the First Amendment, [or] search and seizure ...." Nancy Gibbs, The Two 
Knocks on Miers, TIME, October 17, 2005 at 40. 
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would look to a number of factors, as it did in Lawrence, to deter­
mine societal trends, including current medical standards. 
On November 24, 2004, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held 
unconstitutional a New Hampshire statute that prevented abortions 
from being performed on unemancipated minors until forty-eight 
hours passed following parental notification.190 The statute waived 
the notice provision if the abortion was necessary to save the life of 
the minor, but it did not contain a similar waiver to protect the 
minor's health in non- life threatening situations. During the prep­
aration of this article, the United States Supreme Court heard the 
case.l91 When the Court decides the case this term, the theories 
posited in this article will be put to a test with perhaps two new 
Justices sitting on the Court. 
190. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004). 
191. Heed, 390 F.3d at 53, cert. granted sub. nom., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood 
of N. New Eng., No. 04-1144,2005 WL 483164 (May 23, 2005). The case was heard on 
November 30, 2005. 
